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David G. Brown
Abstract
Some assert that it is impossible to test preference restrictions against revealed
preference. The “goodness” preference restriction simply assumes that one value of a
nonmarket good is preferred over another other with any ﬁxed commodity consump-
tion. This paper uses a preference-theoretic methodology to show how goodness can be
falsiﬁed by revealed preference for compensation-based welfare analysis. When good-
ness is not directly falsiﬁable, it is still possible to use revealed preference to set lower
bounds on goodness that may be so implausible as to provide an indirect falsiﬁcation
of goodness. In addition to potential application of these techniques with real-world
problems, the principal contribution of this paper is demonstrating that it is possible
to test nonmarket good preference restrictions using only revealed preference. This
paper also illustrates the possible contributions of preference-theoretic methodology in
a literature that is dominated by the discussion of calculus-based techniques.
Keywords: Nonmarket goods, Testing preference restrictions, Preference-theoretic.
iIntroduction
A core methodological problem of nonmarket goods is that market demand by itself does not
provide suﬃcient information for welfare analysis. In the context of a nonmarket good such
as the quality of a public ﬁshery, we may in principle be able to recover revealed preference
between market goods, including the act of ﬁshing, given that the ﬁshery is poor, and we may
also recover such preference information for the alternative situation of when the ﬁshery is
thriving.1 However, we cannot recover from market demand any preference information that
permits direct comparison of a poor versus a thriving ﬁshery. Such information is necessary
for the welfare analysis of ﬁshery quality. I will restate this methodological problem more
precisely after introducing a little notation.
Let z represent a nonmarket good that can take on any values of the set Z. A nonmarket
good may be discrete or continuous, and the values it takes on might be scalars, vectors,
or even non-numerical attributes such as with the preceding example, Z = {Poor Fishery,
Thriving Fishery}. Superscripts are used to distinguish individual elements of Z, as in
za,zb ∈ Z. Let X = ℜL
+ be the commodity consumption set with typical element x, and
deﬁne Y = X × Z with typical element (x,z). With this notation I can now provide a
stylized understanding of the central methodological problem of nonmarket goods.2
To facilitate general welfare analysis we wish to obtain a complete preference relation on
Y , represented by %Y , such that for any (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ Y we may know whether or not
(xa,za) %Y (xb,zb).3 For the purposes of this paper, revealed preference is simply deﬁned as
the preference information that can be recovered directly from a complete demand function
1This example of ﬁshery quality is drawn from the seminal work of M¨ aler [4]. The market good of ﬁshing
may be viewed as a composite commodity of all those market goods associated with ﬁshing such as the
licence, ﬁshing equipment, and the wage-valued leisure time.
2I describe this characterization as “stylized” primarily because of my assumption that for each value of z
we can recover a complete preference relation on X from demand. Even for some common demand functions
this is not technically possible. For example, if demand is obtained from Cobb-Douglas then it is not possible
to recover preference for points on the axes. Also, preference recovery may not be empirically feasible in
some situations. However these are primarily problems of recovering revealed preference for the standard
situation with only market goods, i.e., without nonmarket goods. With this simplifying assumption I have
narrowed the focus to those new problems that accompany the inclusion of nonmarket goods.
3For any particular welfare question involving a nonmarket good we will generally not need all of this
preference information, but we will always need at least some preference information involving distinctions
between diﬀerent values of z.
1for market goods without any additional restrictions on preference.4 We will have a distinct
demand function for each z value, z ∈ Z.5 Therefore, we can only recover preferences
on values of x for given ﬁxed values of z. For each z ∈ Z we deﬁne %z as the z-ﬁxed
preference relation on X that represents consumer preference on the commodity space given
that speciﬁc value for the nonmarket good. For example, in the case of the ﬁshery we might
be able to recover %poor and %thriving. The entirety of recoverable revealed preference is
therefore deﬁned by the set {%z |z ∈ Z}. Thus for any given z ∈ Z and any xa,xb ∈ X
we may ascertain whether or not (xa,z) %Y (xb,z) since xa %z xb ⇐⇒ (xa,z) %Y (xb,z).
However, for any (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ Y with za  = zb, we cannot determine whether or not
(xa,za) %Y (xb,zb). Thus our knowledge of preference on Y is incomplete, and we are in
particular missing the preference information that is necessary to consider welfare issues
involving distinctions in the value of the nonmarket good.
The missing preference information problem is illustrated by Figure 1, where %za and %zb
are depicted for some za,zb ∈ Z with za  = zb and X = ℜ2
+. These two revealed preference
relations are respectively represented by the Ia
j and Ib
j indiﬀerence curves. We know, for
example, that all the points in Ia
5 are preferred to the points in Ia
3 and all the points in Ib
4
are preferred over the elements of Ib
1. However from revealed preference alone, we do not
know whether or not the consumer prefers the points of Ia
5 (with z = za) over those of Ib
3
(with z = zb). The problem is then identifying the remaining preference information that
will enable us to compare the indiﬀerence curves in part (a) with those in part (b).
There are several diverse methodological approaches for providing the necessary prefer-
ence information not available through revealed preference. One approach involves imposing
preference assumptions on %Y . These assumptions are sometimes called “preference restric-
tions” or “maintained hypotheses.” Examples range from the M¨ aler’s seminal work with weak
complementarity,6 to the indirect preference restrictions suggested by Ebert [1]. Such as-
sumptions typically provide suﬃcient auxiliary “information” so that together with revealed
preference it is possible to determine a complete unique relation on Y . However there are
4This deﬁnition extends narrower uses of the term “revealed preference” such as with the weak and strong
axioms of revealed preference, to include for example recovery of preference through solving the integrability
problem. See [6].
5To say that they are distinct does not imply that the demand functions are necessarily diﬀerent in the
sense of yielding diﬀerent commodity values for the same price vector. However as we shall see later, if they
are diﬀerent then we can say more about the overall preference relation.
6The concept was ﬁrst developed in [4] and the terminology was introduced three years later in [5].
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Figure 1: Revealed preference with alternative nonmarket good values.
exceptions that still supplement revealed preference but are insuﬃcient to yield a complete
relation on Y , and hence may be used in combination with one or more other assumptions.
The principal example of such an incomplete preference restriction is the simple idea that
the nonmarket good is indeed a “good” in that given any two values, one of those values
is naturally “better” so that it always preferred over the other. For example, this idea is
sometimes explicitly incorporated into the presentation of weak complementarity (e.g. [8]).
A more precise deﬁnition of “goodness” is developed below.
It is widely understood that for any given set of revealed preference information {%z
|z ∈ Z}, it is possible to impose any one of a number of diﬀerent and mutually inconsistent
preference restrictions, so that the choice of any particular restriction may be easily seen as
subjective and even arbitrary.7 Thus it is impossible to aﬃrm a speciﬁc preference assump-
tion such as weak complementarity or goodness using only revealed preference information.
From this impossibility some have concluded that it is also impossible to test such preference
restrictions “because they have no implications for the consumer’s behavior.”8 However this
does not logically follow. In this paper I show how the simple assumption of goodness can be
7Such criticism is given by Ebert [1, 2] and Herriges et al. [3].
8[1, p. 374]. Similarly, von Haefen [8, p. 16] states that weak complementarity is not testable based on a
general argument that would apply to other preference restrictions such as goodness.
3falsiﬁed by revealed preference for purposes of compensation-based welfare analysis. Also,
for situations where goodness is not directly falsiﬁable, I show that it is often possible to use
revealed preference to set lower bounds on goodness. In some situations, these lower bounds
may be so implausible as to provide an indirect falsiﬁcation of goodness.
Goodness and Comparability
Goodness of the nonmarket good is based on an ordering of all possible z values. For
convenience, and without loss of generality, I shall assume that this ordering is a strict total
order so that there is some complete, transitive and irreﬂexive relation ≻Z deﬁned on the
elements of Z.9 With our earlier ﬁshery example we would probably have “Thriving ≻Z
Poor.” For another example, if z is the average transit-time for some monopoly regular
common carrier passenger service, then Z = (0,∞) and for any za,zb ∈ Z we would have
za ≻Z zb ⇔ za < zb.10
The ordering ≻Z is only concerned with the elements of Z. However, if we also consider
commodity consumption, extending the preference domain to Y , we may use ≻Z to specify a
preference restriction on %Y . In this context, it seems intuitive that if the commodity vector
is ﬁxed, preference is then determined only by the diﬀerence in the z values and therefore
decided by ≻Z. This is the preference restriction that I shall call “goodness”:
Deﬁnition. Goodness: A nonmarket good z with strict total order ≻Z has goodness with
respect to that ordering if for all pairs za,zb ∈ Z we have za ≻Z zb ⇒ (x,za) ≻Y (x,zb) for
all x ∈ X.11
9From these properties is follows that the equivalence sets of ≻Z are all singletons. In some situations
the most natural ordering deﬁned on Z might not be strict, such as perhaps with vector-valued z elements.
Equivalence sets might not then be singletons (as with the indiﬀerence sets of standard individual commodity
preference). In such a case we can think of ≻Z as being deﬁned over the equivalence sets of this initial
nonstrict total order.
10Notational reminder: We have used preference notation for three distinct types of orderings that may
be distinguished by the subscripts on the preference notation. The ﬁrst is the original preference relation
over Y that needs to be recovered or identiﬁed. It is represented by %Y as in (xa,za) %Y (xb,zb) for
(xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ Y . Second, revealed preference on X for any ﬁxed za ∈ Z is represented by %za so that
x1 %za x2 ⇔ (x1,za) %Y (x2,za) for x1,x2 ∈ X. Finally, as just introduced, we have a strict ordering on Z
that is distinguished by an upper case Z subscript, ≻Z.
11≻Y is the strict preference associated with %Y . In particular, (xa,za) ≻Y (xb,zb) ⇔
4Since this property of goodness cannot be observed from revealed preference, it can only be
an assumption imposed on %Y . It is thus a “preference restriction” in the standard use of that
term. It captures the notion of goodness in nonmarket goods as it is usually understood in
economics as an idea of ceteris paribus so that, for example, I prefer to have faster transport
service, everything else being equal with respect to both commodity consumption and other
nonmarket goods.12
Preference restrictions such as goodness or weak complementarity are only introduced to
facilitate welfare analysis of the nonmarket good. Welfare analysis metrics in economics are
based on specifying a commensurate change in another dimension such as wealth, price or
commodity consumption. Standard welfare measures such as equivalent variation, compen-
sating variation and consumer surplus seek to specify a change in wealth that is analogous to
a change in price. However, this wealth metric is theoretically based on obtaining a change
in the consumption vector, as chosen by the consumer, that is equivalent with the change in
consumption due to the price change. Thus commodity compensation provides the basis for
other types of compensation.
Extending this to welfare analysis for changes in nonmarket goods, we need to be able
to specify a change in consumption that is equivalent to a given change in z, which is to
say that the consumer is indiﬀerent between these two changes. The following condition
of comparability is thus necessary for any type of compensation-based welfare measure for
nonmarket goods:
Deﬁnition. Comparability: A preference relation %Y deﬁned on Y is comparable if for any
x1 ∈ X and za,zb ∈ Z there exists some x2 ∈ X such that (x1,za) ∼Y (x2,zb).
Then starting at x1 with nonmarket good value zb, the change in commodity space to x2 is
equivalent to the change in z value to za.
For the rest of this paper I shall assume that %Y is complete and transitive, and that all
￿
(xa,za) %Y (xb,zb) and (xb,zb)  %Y (xa,za)
￿
for all (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ Y (where “ %Y ” is “not %Y ”).
12Some readers might note that as I have deﬁned it, goodness violates weak complementarity. This occurs
because weak complementarity requires (x,za) ∼Y (x,zb) for a set of commodity vectors in the boundary
of X = ℜL
+. This conﬂict would disappear if we instead used a slightly diﬀerent deﬁnition of goodness
that is only concerned with commodity vectors in the strictly positive orthant, x ∈ ℜL
++. The development
presented in the remainder of this paper could be easily reworked to accommodate this faintly weaker
deﬁnition of goodness. Moreover, weak complementarity is just another preference restriction with no claim
to preeminence.
5%z, z ∈ Z, are continuous, strictly convex and monotone.13
Falsifying Goodness
The use of goodness as a preference restriction to assist compensation-based welfare analysis
for a nonmarket good requires comparability. Therefore, falsifying goodness for purposes of
welfare analysis may be accomplished by showing that goodness and comparability are mu-
tually incompatible with what is known about preference in the form of revealed preference.
We start with a strict total order ≻Z on Z, so that for some za,zb ∈ Z we have za ≻Z zb.
We then assume that z has goodness with respect to ≻Z, and that the preference relation
%Y on Y is comparable. All of this preference “information” is supposition imposed by the
researcher, however intuitive these assumptions may be.
Suppose that there exists some x1 ∈ X, such that the za indiﬀerence set including x1
intersects with every zb indiﬀerence set superior to x1. This situation is depicted in panel
(a) of Figure 2 for X = ℜ2
+, with Ia representing the za indiﬀerence set containing x1, and a
sampling of the zb indiﬀerence sets superior to x1 indicated by the Ib
j curves, j = 1,...,4.14
Everything stated in this paragraph would be observable from available revealed preference
in the form of %za and %zb.
Now we can combine the assumptions and revealed preference information. From compa-
rability there exists some x2 such that (x1,za) ∼Y (x2,zb). With ≻Z, a change from za to zb is
a degradation of the nonmarket good. With goodness, this degradation can be compensated
for only by going to a more preferred level of consumption so that x2 ≻zb x1.15 Thus x2 must
be in a zb indiﬀerence set superior to x1. For example in the ﬁgure, x2 is on the zb indiﬀer-
ence curve Ib
2. Then from our previous characterization of revealed preference, we know that
the zb indiﬀerence set including x2 must intersect with the za indiﬀerence set including x1.
Therefore, there is some commodity vector x3 that is a member of both of these indiﬀerence
13Each %z also inherits completeness and transitivity from %Y .
14Figure 2 is similar to Smith and Banzhaf’s [7] fanned indiﬀerence curves presentation of weak comple-
mentarity which also involves layering multiple sets of indiﬀerence curves for diﬀerent values of the nonmarket
good. In a footnote, Smith and Banzhaf also provide a brief history of this kind of presentation.
15From comparability and goodness respectively, we have (x2,zb) ∼Y (x1,za) and (x1,za) ≻Y (x1,zb).
Then with transitivity we get (x2,zb) ≻Y (x1,zb) which is equivalent to x2 ≻zb x1.
6sets. In our two dimensional ﬁgure, x3 is the intersection of Ia and Ib
2. From its membership
in Ia we have (x3,za) ∼Y (x1,za), and from its membership in Ib
2 we get (x3,zb) ∼Y (x2,zb).
Then from (x1,za) ∼Y (x2,zb) and transitivity we obtain (x3,za) ∼Y (x3,zb). But this last
statement contradicts goodness. Therefore, given the revealed preference structure described
in the preceding paragraph, the two conditions of goodness and comparability are mutually
incompatible.
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Figure 2: Given comparability, falsifying goodness with revealed preference.
I now brieﬂy consider the same assumptions with but with a diﬀerent revealed preference
scenario.16 We again have a strict total order ≻Z on Z with za ≻Z zb for some za,zb ∈ Z, and
assume both goodness and comparability. Suppose that this time from revealed preference
we ﬁnd that there is some x4 ∈ X such that the zb indiﬀerence set including x4 intersects
with every za indiﬀerence set inferior to x4. This situation is depicted in panel (b) of
Figure 2, with Ib indicating the zb indiﬀerence set and the za indiﬀerence sets represented
by the Ia
j indiﬀerence curves. Then from comparability there exists some x5 such that
(x4,zb) ∼Y (x5,za). A change from zb to za is an improvement of the nonmarket good which
16With standard utility functions such as Cobb-Douglas, etc., it may well be that each of these two revealed
preference scenarios implies the other. However I do not believe this is true for the general case, i.e., for all
possible za and zb preference relations.
7can be oﬀset only by a degradation in commodity consumption, so that x4 ≻za x5.17 In
the ﬁgure this is indicated by placing x5 on the za indiﬀerence curve Ia
3. From observed
revealed preference we know that there exists some x6 ∈ X that is a member of both Ib
and Ia
3. From its membership in Ib we have (x6,zb) ∼ (x4,zb), and its membership in Ia
3
we get (x6,za) ∼ (x5,za). Then from (x4,zb) ∼ (x5,za) we obtain (x6,za) ∼ (x6,zb), again
contradicting goodness.
With both of the revealed preference scenarios just presented, goodness and comparability
are mutually incompatible. In that comparability is a prerequisite for using goodness in
the context of compensation-based welfare analysis, we may say that goodness is refuted
for purposes of welfare analysis in each of these scenarios. However, without restricting
ourselves to compensation-based welfare analysis, we can only say that goodness is falsiﬁed
to the extent that the intuitive case for comparability is more compelling than the case
for goodness. For example, with ﬁshery quality for sport ﬁshing it would seem that the
case for comparability is very strong as we would expect any reasonable person to have a
“price” that would enable compensation for a poor quality ﬁshery. With most traditional
nonmarket goods, the intuitive case for comparability is probably more convincing than the
case for goodness. However, it may be that the case for goodness is more persuasive for some
extreme nonmarket goods, such as perhaps involving cataclysmic environmental damage.
When goodness is falsiﬁed it may seem that the associated ≻Z ordering is also falsiﬁed
in that it no longer has any economic meaning. It is true that with goodness falsiﬁed,
za ≻Z zb does not imply that the consumer always strictly prefers za over zb with ﬁxed
commodity consumption. However, it is still possible to associate the z-ordering with a
weaker understanding of goodness:
Deﬁnition. Weak Goodness: A nonmarket good z with strict total order ≻Z has weak
goodness with respect to that ordering if for all pairs za,zb ∈ Z we have
z
a ≻Z z
b ⇒
(
(x,za) %Y (x,zb) for all x ∈ X,
(x,za) ≻Y (x,zb) for at least one x ∈ X.
With weak goodness, whether the consumer cares about the nonmarket good may de-
pend on the consumption vector. For a given pair of nonmarket good values, the consumer
may be indiﬀerent between them for some baskets of market goods but must care about
17From comparability and goodness respectively, we have (x4,zb) ∼Y (x5,za) and (x4,za) ≻Y (x4,zb),
and thus obtain (x4,za) ≻Y (x5,za) from transitivity.
8the distinction for at least one consumption vector. For example, in the context of weak
complementarity, it is assumed that the consumer only cares about ﬁshery quality if she
actually ﬁshes, where the act of ﬁshing is treated as market good.
Weak goodness can also be falsiﬁed with revealed preference. As previously, I will ﬁrst
state the preference restrictions, followed by a hypothetical characterization of revealed pref-
erence, and then combine these to obtain a contradiction. We again have a strict total order
≻Z on Z with za ≻Z zb for some za,zb ∈ Z. We assume that z has weak goodness with
respect to ≻Z and that %Y is comparable. As might be expected, falsifying weak goodness
requires more revealed preference structure than we needed to falsify goodness, even though
it is more simply stated: every za indiﬀerence set intersects with every zb indiﬀerence set.18
From weak goodness there must exist some x1 ∈ X such that (x1,za) ≻Y (x1,zb), and
from comparability there exists some x2 such that (x1,za) ∼Y (x2,zb).19 As with the ﬁrst
example for falsifying goodness, the degradation of the nonmarket good from za to zb can be
oﬀset only by an improvement in commodity consumption, so that x2 ≻zb x1. This situation
is depicted in Figure 3 where x2 is on a zb indiﬀerence curve superior to x1. Let x3 be any
point such that x3 ≫ x2, so that with the monotonicity of %zb we have x3 ≻zb x2 which
may be also stated as (x3,zb) ≻Y (x2,zb).20 As depicted in the ﬁgure, this third point is zb-
superior to both x1 and x2. From transitivity we have (x3,zb) ≻Y (x1,za). I now apply the
revealed preference scenario. From it we know that the zb indiﬀerence set including x3 must
intersect with the za indiﬀerence set including x1. Let x4 be a member of this intersection.
This is depicted in Figure 3 where x4 is the intersection of the Ia and Ib
2 indiﬀerence curves.
We thus have (x4,za) ∼Y (x1,za) and (x4,zb) ∼Y (x3,zb). Then from (x3,zb) ≻Y (x1,za)
and transitivity we obtain (x4,zb) ≻Y (x4,za), contradicting weak goodness.
With the speciﬁed revealed preference scenario I have shown that weak goodness and
comparability are mutually incompatible. As discussed above for goodness, actual falsiﬁ-
cation of weak goodness occurs in the context of compensation-based welfare analysis or
18For example, this would be true with two diﬀerent Cobb-Douglas preference relations such as deﬁned by
ua(x1,x2) = (x1)1/3(x2)2/3 and ub(x1,x2) = (x1)2/3(x2)1/3.
19The logical development of this paragraph parallels in some ways the previous presentations showing
that goodness and comparability may be inconsistent. However a key diﬀerence is that the previous initial
points (x1 and x4 in Figure 2) were observed as part of the revealed preference scenarios, while this x1 initial
point is not observed but is instead assumed to exist as consequence of assuming weak goodness.
20The notation x3 ≫ x2 indicates that x3 is strictly greater than x2 for all L commodity components:
x3
i > x2
i, i = 1,...,L.
9x1
x2
x1
x2
x3
x4
Ia
Ib
1
Ib
2
Figure 3: Falsifying weak goodness with revealed preference.
if the case for comparability is more compelling than the case for weak goodness. When
weak goodness is falsiﬁed, it seems to me that the associated ≻Z ordering has no economic
meaning and in that sense is also falsiﬁed.
Lower Bounds on Goodness
With each of the two revealed preference scenarios considered for falsifying goodness, it is
nevertheless possible that goodness is valid, but then comparability would not be valid at
the starting point, x1 or x4 respectively (see Figure 2). Then the preference for za over zb
would be so strong at these two points that compensation by a change in consumption is
not possible. From this perspective, what we have done with those two scenarios can be
thought of as establishing an inﬁnite lower bound on the relative goodness of za over zb at
x1 and x4. That is, if indeed za is preferred over zb in the context of goodness, then with
consumption vectors x1 and x4 there is no level of additional consumption that is suﬃcient
to make up for having zb instead of za. Thus with each of these scenarios, we must either
have inﬁnite goodness of za over zb at the starting point, or have some points in X where za
is not strictly preferred over zb.
This inﬁnite lower bound on goodness is a consequence of there being an inﬁnite extent
10of intersecting indiﬀerence sets as in “the za indiﬀerence set including x1 intersects with
every zb indiﬀerence set superior to x1,” and as depicted in both panels of Figure 2. With a
more limited range of known indiﬀerence set intersections we may instead obtain ﬁnite lower
bounds on goodness.
We again assume goodness with respect to some strict total order ≻Z on Z with za ≻Z
zb for some za,zb ∈ Z. However, comparability is not assumed. This time the revealed
preference scenario is very local. Suppose that a za indiﬀerence set Ia
0 intersects with a zb
indiﬀerence set Ib
0 in a manner such that there are two distinct points xa,xb ∈ X with xa ∈ Ia
0,
xb ∈ Ib
0 and xb ≥ xa. We designate by x0 one of the points in Ia
0
T
Ib
0. As illustrated in Figure
4, there are two possible settings for this scenario. First, the two indiﬀerence surfaces might
pass through each other, as was the case with all of the intersecting indiﬀerence surfaces
discussed in the previous section. This is depicted in panel a, with the two indiﬀerence
surfaces crossing so that Ib
0 is below Ia
0 in the upper left, but above Ia
0 in the lower right.21
Alternatively, the two surfaces might just touch without passing through each other. This is
illustrated in panel b where Ib
0 is always above Ia
0 except where it achieves a tangency at x0.
With either setting depicted in Figure 4, by assuming goodness, we have za preferred
over zb everywhere. However, we do not know by how much. Suppose we want to determine
the extent to which za is preferred over zb at xa. We wish to specify the goodness of z at xa
in terms of additional consumption that is suﬃcient to make up for having zb instead of za.
That is, we are looking for some x1 ∈ X with x1 ≥ xa such that (xa,za) ∼Y (x1,zb).22 We
have (xa,za) ∼Y (x0,za) and (xb,zb) ∼Y (x0,zb). With goodness we get (x0,za) ≻Y (x0,zb),
and hence from transitivity, (xa,za) ≻Y (xb,zb). Therefore a change in material consumption
from xa to xb is insuﬃcient compensation for having zb instead of za. Thus, given goodness,
we have established a strict ﬁnite lower bound on the goodness of za over zb at xa. This
lower bound is the net commodity bundle xb−xa.
The discussion of the previous paragraph is illustrated equally well by the two panels
of Figure 4 so that they are completely redundant. However, the diﬀerences between these
21The terms “above” and “below” as used here are relative to the origin so that an indiﬀerence surface Iα
is “above” another indiﬀerence surface Iβ in a region where for points xβ ∈ Iβ we also have points xα ∈ Iα
with xα ≫ xβ. Thus as a graphical description in the context of Figure 4, “above” becomes “above and to
the right.”
22Since we have not assumed comparability, we do not know that x1 exists. However we can still establish
limits on it, if it existed. That is what we are doing here. If it exists, x1 will not be unique.
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Figure 4: Establishing lower bounds on goodness with revealed preference.
two ﬁgures bears on the nature of our lower bound. In the upper right of each panel there
is fourth point on second zb indiﬀerence curve, x1 ∈ Ib
1. This is the potentially mythical
consumption level referred to in the previous paragraph that would suﬃciently compensate
for having zb instead of za, if we start at xa. We can qualify the strength of our lower bound
by considering how close x1 ∈ Ib
1 can be to xb ∈ Ib
0. What might prevent them from being
to close together is that Ib
1 cannot intersect with Ia
0, as otherwise x1 would take on all the
properties of xb as presented in the preceding paragraph and hence would not oﬀer suﬃcient
compensation.
Panel a illustrates the situation where the Ia
0 and Ib
0 indiﬀerence surfaces pass through
each other. In this case there is clearly a whole range of zb indiﬀerence surfaces superior to
Ib
0 that Ia
0 also intersects, and which therefore cannot be cannot be candidates for Ib
1. The
limit as to how close Ib
1 can be to Ib
0 is deﬁned by how far Ia
0 extends above Ib
0. If the za
indiﬀerence curve extends suﬃciently above Ib
0 so that it intersects all superior zb indiﬀerence
curves, such as was represented in panel a of Figure 2, then Ib
1 cannot exist and compensation
is not possible.
On the other hand, with the situation depicted panel b of Figure 4, where Ia
0 and Ib
0 only
touch each other and do not pass through each other, any zb indiﬀerence surface superior to
Ib
0 will not intersect with Ia
0, and hence is feasible as Ib
1. In this latter case, the lower bound
12itself is in a sense bounded in that it is not possible to use revealed preference to establish
an even higher ﬂoor on the relative goodness of za over zb given consumption level xa.
Thus with Ia
0 and Ib
0 passing through each other as depicted in panel a, the ﬁnite lower
bound we established on goodness is inherently understated and there might even be an
inﬁnite lower bound available from revealed preference. On the other hand with Ia
0 and Ib
0
just tangent to each other as depicted in panel b, the lower bound we have obtained is the
best that can be determined with revealed preference.
If the two preference relations %za and %zb are not identical, then there must be some
intersecting indiﬀerence surfaces such as depicted in panel a of Figure 4, and the existence of
points xa,xb ∈ X with the speciﬁed properties immediately follows.23 Therefore, if there is
any change in commodity preference as a consequence of changing the value of the nonmarket
good, then there must exist consumption vectors such as xa for which we can establish lower
bounds on the relative goodness of the two values of the nonmarket good.
As before with the inﬁnite lower bound on goodness, the ﬁnite lower bound at xa (as
depicted in either panel of Figure 4) is predicated on goodness. Without this universal
property (i.e., on all x ∈ X), it might well be that a change in consumption to xb is more
than enough to make up for the diﬀerence in nonmarket good values. Thus the analyst
is again faced with a choice between rejecting the universal superiority of za over zb (in
the sense of goodness), or accepting the local lower bounds on goodness as obtained from
revealed preference. If the lower bound is not credible, then this may be a basis for rejecting
goodness. For example, suppose that the nonmarket good is commuter train frequency and
we are concerned with the distinction between 6 and 4 trains per hour, then the xb−xa
compensation vector lower bound would not be plausible if it included a large fraction of
all current consumption for the upper-middle class commuter. In this case we would reject
goodness. Thus goodness may be in a sense falsiﬁed with either inﬁnite lower bounds as in
the previous section, or with ﬁnite bounds as in this section. With both it may be a matter
of comparing the plausibility of two alternatives.
23Given any kind of monotonicity property such as local nonsatiation, %za and %zb will be identical if and
only if they imply the same set of indiﬀerence sets. If the sets of indiﬀerence sets {Ia} and {Ib} are in any
way diﬀerent in the interior of X then there will always be some intersections such as depicted in panel a of
Figure 4. With such an interior intersection, on some “side” of the intersection we will have a region where
the za indiﬀerence surface is “below” the zb indiﬀerence surface, in the sense of being closer to the origin.
The existence of points xa,xb ∈ X with the speciﬁed properties immediately follows.
13If one of the market goods is tied to the nonmarket good, such as the way sport ﬁshing
is tied to ﬁshery quality or use of commuter trains is tied to train frequency, then we would
expect that change in the nonmarket good value would accompany a change in preference
over market goods. Preference between sport ﬁshing and a composite good is depicted in
Figure 5 for both a low and a high quality ﬁshery. If ﬁshery quality is improved, we would
anticipate that the marginal rate of substitution between ﬁshing and other market goods
would change to reﬂect a greater relative marginal value for ﬁshing. This is illustrated by the
preference rotation between panels (a) and (b) as the marginal rate of substitution increases
at every point. If we superimposed the two panels on top of each other, each indiﬀerence
curve in either panel would intersect a large range of curves from the other panel.24 Thus,
with a tie-in between the nonmarket good and a market good, we would expect crossing
indiﬀerence surfaces such as depicted in Figures 2, 3 and 4, and therefore would anticipate
an opportunity to establish bounds on goodness (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) with revealed preference.
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(b) With strong ﬁshery
Figure 5: Rotation of preference with change in nonmarket good
24With some standard utility functions such as alternative parameterizations of Cobb-Douglas (see note
18), each indiﬀerence curve in the left panel would intersect with each curve in the right. However this not
true of other utility functions such as CES.
14Conclusions
This paper has practical as well as larger conceptual implications. First on the practical
side, it shows how we may use revealed preference to either falsify the universal goodness of
a nonmarket good in the context of welfare analysis or establish lower bounds on the local
goodness of the nonmarket good. With reasonable revealed preference scenarios (depicted in
Figure 2), I show that we can either outright refute goodness for purposes of compensation-
based welfare analysis, or falsify goodness on the basis of it being less compelling than
comparability. In the context of Figure 3, this is extended to a much weaker understanding of
goodness. With even less revealed preference structure, we can establish ﬁnite lower bounds
on goodness. With all of these revealed preference scenarios, there is a choice between
rejecting universal goodness or accepting an alternative based on relative plausibility.
The larger conceptual implication of this paper is that it is possible to falsify a preference
restriction with revealed preference alone, at least for welfare analysis. In particular, we have
used revealed preference to falsify statements (both regular goodness and weak goodness)
that could not observed from revealed preference. Thus, the inability to aﬃrm a preference
restriction with revealed preference does not preclude the possibility of using revealed pref-
erence to deny the same preference restriction. The preference restriction falsiﬁed in this
paper is incomplete in that goodness by itself does not provide suﬃcient auxiliary preference
“information” to determine a complete unique relation on Y . We might expect that complete
preference restrictions such as weak complementarity may be even more readily falsiﬁed with
revealed preference. To be complete, these assumptions must bring with them even more
preference information, and hence more potential conﬂicts with revealed preference.
The preference-theoretic methodology applied here is quite diﬀerent from the calculus-
based techniques that dominate the theoretical and methodological literature for welfare
analysis involving nonmarket goods. The latter approach is probably quite necessary for
applications to ﬁnd actual welfare values. However, any calculus-based methodology that
seeks to specify or approximate an exact welfare measure is ultimately based on a preference-
theoretic understanding of consumer behavior and welfare, much as high level computer pro-
grams must ultimately depend on low level machine language. Moreover for some purposes,
such as the applications presented here, calculus is not an eﬀective substitute for directly
working with preference. A preference-theoretic approach may be better suited for most
problems that require a detailed understanding of the interaction between diﬀerent sources
of preference information, such as between revealed preference and preference restrictions.
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